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This paper studies the causes and consequences of 
informality and applies the analysis to countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  It starts with a discussion 
on the definition and measures of informality, as well 
as on the reasons why widespread informality should 
be of great concern. The paper analyzes informality’s 
main determinants, arguing that informality is not 
single-caused but results from the combination of poor 
public services, a burdensome regulatory regime, and 
weak monitoring and enforcement capacity by the 
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state. This combination is especially explosive when the 
country suffers from low educational achievement and 
features demographic pressures and primary production 
structures. Using cross-country regression analysis, 
the paper evaluates the empirical relevance of each 
determinant of informality. It then applies the estimated 
relationships to most countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean in order to assess the country-specific 
relevance of each proposed mechanism 
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Informality is the collection of firms, workers, and activities that operate outside 
the legal and regulatory frameworks.
1  It entails avoiding the burden of taxation and 
regulation but, at the same time, not fully enjoying the protection and services that the 
law and the state can provide.  Informality is sometimes the result of agents “exiting” the 
formal sector as consequence of cost-benefit considerations; other times, it is the outcome 
of agents being “excluded” from formality as this becomes restrictive and the economy 
segmented.   
In all cases, informality is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment and 
is best understood as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon.  It is determined both by the 
modes of socio-economic organization inherent to economies in the transition to 
modernity and by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through 
regulation, monitoring, and the provision of public services.  Informality is not only a 
reflection of underdevelopment, but may also be the source of further economic 
retardation.  It implies misallocation of resources and entails losing the advantages of 
legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal credit institutions, and 
participation in international markets.   
According to the estimates presented below, there is large heterogeneity in the 
extent of informality across countries in Latin America.  In all of them, however, 
informality is much more widespread than in the USA, and some countries in the region 
are among the most informal economies in the world.  The typical country in Latin 
America produces about 40% of GDP and employs 70% of the labor force informally.  
These are astounding statistics, which indicate that informality is a substantive and 
pervasive phenomenon that must be explained and grappled with, particularly in the 
design of development policies.   
                                                 
1 This definition, introduced by De Soto (1989) in his classic study of informality, has gained remarkable 
popularity due to its conceptual strength, which allows it to focus on the root causes of informality rather 
than merely its symptoms.  For an excellent review of the causes and consequences of the informal sector, 
see Schneider and Enste (2000).  Drawing from a public-choice approach, Gerxhani (2004) provides an 
interesting discussion of the differences of the informal sector in developed and developing countries.  The 
World Bank report by Perry et al. (2007) is the most comprehensive and in-depth study on informality in 
the Latin America region.    
  2This chapter studies informality in Latin America from a macroeconomic and 
international perspective.  It uses the cross-country variation on informality measures and 
potentially related variables to study its causes and consequences.  It then examines Latin 
American countries against this broad international context.   The paper is organized as 
follows.  Section I presents and discusses various measures of informality.  Section II 
assesses the impact of informality on economic growth and poverty.  Section III analyzes 
the main causes of informality.  Section IV evaluates the empirical relevance of each 
determinant of informality to every Latin American country in the sample.  Finally, we 
offer some concluding remarks.  
 
I. Measuring Informality in Latin America and around the World  
Although the definition of informality can be simple and precise, its measurement 
is not.  Given that it is identified with working outside the legal and regulatory 
frameworks, informality is best described as a latent, unobserved variable.  That is, a 
variable for which an accurate and complete measurement is not feasible but for which an 
approximation is possible through indicators reflecting its various aspects.  Here we 
consider four such indicators, available for a relatively large collection of countries.  Two 
of them refer to overall informal activity in the country, and the other two relate in 
particular to informal employment.  Each indicator on its own has conceptual and 
statistical shortcomings as a proxy for informality; taken together, however, they may 
provide a robust approximation to the subject. 
The indicators related to overall informal activity are the Schneider index of the 
shadow economy and the Heritage Foundation index of informal markets.
2  T h e  
Schneider index combines the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicator-multiple-cause) 
method, the physical input (electricity) method, and the excess currency-demand 
approach for the estimation of the share of production that is not declared to tax and 
regulatory authorities.  The Heritage Foundation index is based on subjective perceptions 
of general compliance with the law, with particular emphasis on the role played by 
official corruption.   
                                                 
2 Details on definitions, sources, and samples for these and other variables used in this chapter are provided 
in Appendix 2.   
  3The indicators that focus on the labor aspect of informality are the prevalence of 
self-employment and the lack of pension coverage.  The former is given by the ratio of 
self to total employment, as reported by the International Labor Organization.  The latter 
is given by the fraction of the labor force that does not contribute to a retirement pension 
scheme, as given in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Appendix 3 
presents some descriptive statistics on the four informality indicators.  In particular, it 
shows that, as expected, they are significantly positively correlated, with correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.59 to 0.90 –high enough to represent the same phenomenon 
but not so high as to make them mutually redundant.       
Using data on these four indicators, we can assess the prevalence of informality 
across Latin America.  For comparison purposes, Figure 1 presents data on the four 
informality indicators for individual countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC).  The USA and Chile are used as benchmark countries.  The USA is the developed 
country to which the region is most closely related.  Chile is the Latin American country 
often taken as a model for economic reforms and sustained growth in the region.
3  It is 
clear from the figure that there is considerable variation in informality across countries in 
Latin America.  However, in all of them, the degree of informality is much higher than in 
the USA; and for some countries (e.g., Bolivia and Haiti) it is comparable to the most 
informal countries in the world.    For the median country in Latin America, about 40% 
of GDP is produced informally.  Informal employment is more difficult to ascertain.  
Using the measure based on pension contributions, about 70% of the labor force is 
informal in the median country in Latin America.
4     
 
II. The Cost of Informality   
Informality is a distorted, second-best response of an excessively regulated 
economy to the shocks it faces and its potential for growth.  It is a distorted response 
                                                 
3 The LAC countries under consideration are those included in any of the four regressions where 
informality is a dependent variable (Table 3).  They are 20 countries plus Chile, which functions as a 
comparator country, unless otherwise noted.  Trinidad and Tobago is also excluded since the World Bank 
classification (as of July 2007) considers the country as a high-income country.  See Appendix 1 for sample 
of countries in each regression. 
4 Self-employment is arguably a lower bound for the measure of informal labor given that tax and 
regulation evasion occurs massively in all types of firms. 
  4because it implies misallocation of resources and entails losing, at least partially, the 
advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal credit 
institutions, and participation in international markets.  Trying to escape the control of the 
state induces many informal firms to remain sub-optimally small, use irregular 
procurement and distribution channels, and constantly divert resources to mask their 
activities or bribe officials.  Conversely, formal firms are induced to use more intensively 
the resources that are less burdened by the regulatory regime; in particular for developing 
countries, this means that formal firms are less labor intensive than they should be 
according to the countries’ endowments.  In addition, the informal sector generates a 
negative externality that compounds its adverse effect on efficiency: informal activities 
use and congest public infrastructure without contributing the tax revenue to replenish it.  
Since public infrastructure complements private capital in the process of production, a 
larger informal sector implies slower productivity growth.
5 
Compared with a first-best response, the expansion of the informal sector often 
represents distorted and deficient economic growth.
6  This statement merits further 
clarification:  informality is sub-optimal with respect to the first-best scenario that occurs 
in an economy without excessive regulations and with adequate provision of public 
services.  Nevertheless, informality is indeed preferable to a fully formal but sclerotic 
economy that is unable to circumvent its regulation-induced rigidities.  This brings to 
bear an important policy implication: the mechanism of formalization matters 
enormously for its consequences on employment, efficiency, and growth.  If 
formalization is purely based on enforcement, it will likely lead to unemployment and 
low growth.  If, on the other hand, it is based on improvements in both the regulatory 
framework and the quality/availability of public services, it will bring about more 
efficient use of resources and higher growth.   
                                                 
5 See Loayza (1996) for an endogenous-growth model highlighting the negative effect of informality 
through the congestion of public services. 
6 This does not necessarily mean that informal firms are not dynamic or lagging behind their formal 
counterparts.  In fact, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns in both sectors should be equalized at the 
margin.  See Maloney (2004) for evidence on the dynamism of Latin American informal firms.  The 
arguments presented in the text apply to the comparison between an excessively regulated economy and 
one that is not.   
  5From an empirical perspective, the ambiguous impact of formalization highlights 
an important difficulty in assessing the impact of informality on economic growth: two 
countries can have the same level of informality, but if it has been achieved in different 
ways, the countries’ growth rates may also be markedly different.  Countries where 
informality is kept at bay by drastic enforcement will fare worse than countries where 
informality is low because of light regulations and appropriate public services.     
We now present a simple regression analysis of the effect of informality on 
growth.  As suggested above, this analysis must control for enforcement; and a 
straightforward, albeit debatable, way to do so is by including a proxy for the overall 
capacity of the state as a control variable in the regression.  For this purpose, we try two 
proxies: the level of GDP per capita, and the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.  
The former has the advantage of also accounting for conditional convergence, and the 
latter has the advantage of more closely reflecting the size of the state.
7  A n o t h e r  
important consideration for this empirical analysis is that informality may not only affect 
but also be affected by economic growth.  For example, faster growth could raise the 
profitability of production and the real wage, relative to the perceived costs of formality, 
thus encouraging more firms and workers to shift out of the informal sector. In order to 
ascertain the impact of informality on growth, we need to isolate the exogenous variation 
in informality.  We do this through an instrumental-variable approach, where the 
instruments are selected among the variables that are postulated as determinants of 
informality –indicators of law and order, business regulatory freedom, secondary 
schooling, and socio-demographic factors.  Since some of them have a relationship with 
economic growth that is independent of informality, we only use as instruments the sets 
of variables that comply with the exclusion restrictions, as diagnosed by the Hansen test 
of orthogonality between the instruments and the regression residuals (see notes on Table 
1a and 1b).  
Table 1 presents the regression results.  The dependent variable is the average 
growth of per capita GDP over 1985-2005.  We choose a period of about 20 years for the 
measure of average growth in order to achieve a compromise between merely cyclical, 
                                                 
7 We also considered as proxy the ratio of tax revenues to GDP.  Even though the number of observations 
drops considerably, the results were similar regarding the negative effect of informality on growth.  
  6short-run growth (which would be unaffected by informality) and very long-run growth 
(which could be confused with the sources, rather than consequences, of informality).  
We consider two alternative control variables: Initial GDP per capita (Table 1a) or initial 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP (Table 1b).  The explanatory variables of 
interest are the four informality indicators, considered one at a time.  The table first 
presents the ordinary least-square (OLS) results and then the instrumental-variable (IV) 
results.    
The OLS and IV regression results are basically the same regarding the sign and 
significance of the coefficients on the informality indicators.  If anything, the IV 
coefficient estimates are somewhat larger in magnitude than their OLS counterparts.   
They clearly indicate that an increase in informality leads to a decrease in economic 
growth.  All four informality indicators carry negative and highly significant regression 
coefficients.  The harmful effect of informality on growth is not only robust and 
significant, but its magnitude makes it also economically meaningful:  Using the 
estimates from the IV regressions controlling for initial government expenditures/GDP, 
an increase of one standard deviation in any of the informality indicators leads to a 
decline of 0.7 – 1 percentage points in the rate of per capita GDP growth.
8  These are 
conservative estimates when compared to those from the regression that controls for GDP 
per capita –there, the growth effects of a reduction in informality are about twice as large.   
There is also a close connection between poverty and informality, reflecting at 
least in part the negative relationship between economic growth and informality.  Table 2 
presents cross-country regression analysis with the headcount poverty index as dependent 
variable and, in turn, the four measures of informality as explanatory variables.  In order 
to have a close chronological match between dependent and explanatory variables, the 
headcount poverty index corresponds to the latest available measure per country.  As in 
the growth regressions, the level of GDP per capita (Table 2a) or the ratio of government 
expenditures to GDP (Table 2b) are included as control variables.  Also as in previous 
                                                 
8 To be precise, a one-standard-deviation increase of, in turn, the Schneider index, the Heritage Foundation 
index, the share of self-employment, and the labor force lacking pension coverage leads to a decline of, 
respectively, 1.1, 0.8, 0.8, and 0.7 percentage points of per capita GDP growth. 
  7regressions, we present both OLS and IV estimates, the latter to account for the likely 
endogeneity of informality with respect to poverty.   
The regression results reveal a positive relationship between the prevalence of 
informality and the incidence of poverty.  When government expenditure is controlled 
for, the four measures of informality carry positive and significant coefficients in the IV 
regressions.  Similarly, when the level of GDP per capita is controlled for, three of the 
four informality indicators carry positive and significant coefficients (self-employment is 
the exception).   
The significant relationship between informality, on the one hand, and economic 
growth and poverty, on the other, is remarkable: it underscores the importance of the 
issue and urges for the analysis on the complex sources of informality.  To this, we turn 
next. 
  
III. The Causes of Informality  
Informality is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment, shaped both by 
the modes of socio-economic organization inherent to economies in the transition to 
modernity and by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through 
regulation, monitoring, and the provision of public services.  As such, informality is best 
understood as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon.   
Informality arises when the costs of belonging to the country’s legal and 
regulatory framework exceed its benefits.  Formality entails costs of entry --in the form 
of lengthy, expensive, and complicated registration procedures-- and costs of permanence 
--including payment of taxes, compliance with mandated labor benefits and 
remunerations, and observance of environmental, health, and other regulations.  The 
benefits of formality potentially consist of police protection against crime and abuse, 
recourse to the judicial system for conflict resolution and contract enforcement, access to 
legal financial institutions for credit provision and risk diversification, and, more 
generally, the possibility of expanding markets both domestically and internationally.  At 
least in principle, formality also voids the need to pay bribes and prevents penalties and 
fees, to which informal firms are continuously subject to.  Therefore, informality is more 
prevalent when the regulatory framework is burdensome, the quality of government 
  8services to formal firms is low, and the state’s monitoring and enforcement power is 
weak.   
These cost and benefit considerations are affected by the structural characteristics 
of underdevelopment, dealing in particular with educational achievement, production 
structure, and demographic trends.  Other things equal, a higher level of education 
reduces informality by increasing labor productivity and, therefore, making labor 
regulations less onerous and formal returns potentially larger.  Likewise, a production 
structure tilted towards primary sectors like agriculture, rather than to the more complex 
processes of industry, favors informality by making legal protection and contract 
enforcement less relevant and valuable.  Finally, a demographic composition with larger 
shares of youth or rural populations is likely to increase informality by making 
monitoring more difficult and expensive, by placing bigger demands on resources for 
training and acquisition of abilities, by creating bottlenecks in the initial school-to-work 
transition, and by making more problematic the expansion of formal public services (see 
Fields, 1990; Schneider and Enste, 2000; ILO, 2004).   
Popular and even academic discussions often focus on particular sources of 
informality, rather than taking this comprehensive approach.  Thus, some observers stress 
insufficient enforcement and related government weaknesses such as corruption; others 
prefer to emphasize the burden of taxes and regulations; yet others concentrate on 
explanations dealing with social and demographic characteristics.   
As suggested above, all these possibilities make sense, and there is some evidence 
to support each of them.  To illustrate this, Figure 2 presents cross-country scatter plots of 
each of the four measures of informality versus proxies for the major proposed 
determinants of informality.  The sample observations include all countries with available 
data, and, for illustration purposes,  countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are 
highlighted in the figures.  The proxies for the determinants of informality are as 
follows.
9  An index on the prevalence of law and order --obtained from The International 
Country Risk Guide-- to proxy for both the quality of formal public services and 
government’s enforcement strength.  An index of business regulatory freedom --taken 
from Fraser Foundation’s Economic Freedom of the World Report-- to represent the ease 
                                                 
9 Again, details on definitions and sources of all variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
  9of restrictions imposed by the legal and regulatory frameworks.   The average years of 
secondary schooling of the adult population --taken from Barro and Lee (2001)-- to 
represent educational and skill achievement of the working force.  And an index of socio-
demographic factors --constructed from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and other databases-- which includes the share of youth in the population, the share of 
rural population, and the share of agriculture in GDP.
10  
Remarkably, all 16 correlation coefficients (4 informality measures times 4 
determinants) are highly statistically significant, with p-values below 1%, and of large 
magnitude, ranging approximately between 0.54 and 0.87.  All informality measures 
present the same pattern of correlations: informality is negatively related to law and 
order, regulatory freedom, and schooling achievement; and it is positively related to 
factors that denote the early stages of socio-demographic transformation.   
Therefore, all these explanations may hold some truth in them.  What we need to 
determine now is whether each of them has independent explanatory power with respect 
to informality.  Or, more specifically, we need to assess to what extent each of them is 
relevant both in general for the cross-section of countries and in particular for a given 
country.  To this purpose we turn next.   
In what follows, we use cross-country regression analysis to evaluate the general 
significance of each explanation on the origins of informality.  Each of the four 
informality measures presented earlier serves as the dependent variable of its respective 
regression model.  The set of explanatory variables is common to all informality 
measures and represents the major determinants of informality.  They are the same 
variables used in the simple correlation analysis, introduced above.  Then, we apply these 
estimated relationships to the case of the Latin American and Caribbean countries with 
available data in order to evaluate the country-specific relevance of each proposed 
mechanism.  We can do this for those countries that possess complete information on 
dependent and explanatory variables, or at least information on the latter, with which we 
can obtain predicted values of the dependent variable.  There are 20 countries in the Latin 
                                                 
10 This is constructed by first standardizing each component (to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
1) and then taking a simple arithmetic average.  We use a composite index, rather than the components 
separately, given the very high correlation among them. 
  10American and Caribbean region that possess complete information on all explanatory 
variables, but comparable data on self-employment and pension coverage are not 
available for Haiti. Likewise, Nicaragua and Paraguay do not have data on self-
employment, and Guyana has data on the Heritage index only.  (In both cases, however, 
we can construct for them a predicted value based on the regression analysis using the 
sample of all other countries.)     
The regression results are presented in Table 3.  They are remarkably robust 
across informality measures.  Moreover, all regression coefficients have the expected 
sign and are highly significant.  Informality decreases when law and order, business 
regulatory freedom, or schooling achievement rise.  Similarly, informality decreases 
when the production structure shifts away from agriculture and demographic pressures 
from youth and rural populations decline.  The fact that each explanatory variable retains 
its sign and significance after controlling for the rest indicates that no single determinant 
is sufficient to explain informality.  All of them should be taken into account for a 
complete understanding of informality.   
The four explanatory variables account jointly for a large share of the cross-
country variation in informality: the R-squared coefficients are 0.57 for the Schneider 
shadow economy index, 0.89 for the Heritage Foundation informal market index, 0.78 for 
the share of self-employment, and 0.88 for the share of the labor force not contributing to 
a pension program.   
 
IV. Explaining Informality in Latin American Countries 
The cross-country regression analysis presented above can be used to assess the 
determinants of informality that are most relevant to each Latin American country.  The 
first issue to explore is whether these countries are outliers or follow the general trend 
established by the cross-country regressions.  Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of the actual 
vs. predicted values of each informality measure.  (For illustrative purposes, observations 
corresponding to Latin American countries are highlighted in the figure).  The majority of 
countries in the world have small residuals (i.e., the unpredicted portion of informality), a 
fact which is consistent with the large R-squared coefficients obtained in the regressions.   
  11Is this also the case of the Latin American and Caribbean countries under 
consideration?  The answer is not simple and must be nuanced by the heterogeneity of the 
countries in the region.  Some LAC countries are located around the 45-degree line, but 
some are quite far from it.  In fact, when we include a “Latin American and Caribbean 
country” dummy in the regressions, its coefficient turns out to be positive in all cases and 
significant in three of them (the exception is self-employment).
11  The significance of the 
regional dummy indicates that the actual values of informality are larger than the 
predicted values for the majority of countries in the region.  This is so for the Heritage 
index and the pension coverage measure.  For the Schneider index, not only the majority 
of countries have positive residuals but also some of them could be considered as 
outliers.   
In terms of specific countries, the following points seem noteworthy.  For Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Jamaica, the predicted values of informality are similar to their 
actual counterparts in all of the four informality measures.  Five more countries --
Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay-- join this group in all but the 
Schneider index.  In Colombia and Dominican Republic, while predicted values are much 
smaller than actual ones regarding labor informality (the last two indices), the actual and 
predicted values of production informality (that is, the first two indices) are quite close.  
Contrary to this, as clearly shown in the figure, actual values of the Schneider index are 
much larger than predicted ones for Bolivia, Panama, Peru and Uruguay, which in part 
explains why the R-squared coefficient for this regression is smaller than those of the 
other informality measures.  
  Focusing now on the portion of informality explained by the cross-country 
regression model, we can evaluate the importance of each explanatory variable for the 
case of the 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries with sufficient available data.  In 
particular, we can assess how each determinant contributes to the difference in 
informality between individual countries and a comparator one, for which we choose 
Chile given its widely-recognized status of reform leader in the region.  The contribution 
                                                 
11 Regression results with “LAC country” dummy are not presented but available upon request.  For the 
Schneider index, the Heritage index, self employment, and pension coverage, t-statistics of the dummy 
variable are 2.91, 2.46, 1.20, and 2.36, respectively. 
  12of each explanatory variable is obtained by multiplying the corresponding regression 
coefficient (from Table 3) times the difference in the value of this explanatory variable 
between each Latin American and Caribbean country and the comparator country.   
The importance of a particular explanatory variable would, therefore, depend on 
the size of its effect on informality in the cross-section of countries and how far apart the 
two countries are with respect to the explanatory variable in question.  Naturally, the sum 
of the contributions equals the total difference in predicted informality between each 
individual country and Chile.  This difference is plotted in Figure 4.  As expected, it 
shows that all the countries have larger (predicted) informality levels than Chile.  Haiti, 
Honduras and Guatemala are predicted to be the most informal (and in general show the 
largest difference with respect to Chile).  On the other hand, Uruguay, Argentina and 
Costa Rica are predicted to be the least informal among the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, though they still show larger informality levels than Chile.   
  Figure 5 presents the decomposition of the difference of (predicted) informality 
between each of the 20 countries under analysis and Chile.  The figure has four panels, 
corresponding to each of the four informality indicators.  The most remarkable 
observations are the following.  Policy and institutional variables related to the quality of 
the state are the most important factors explaining the differences in informality.   
Restricted regulatory freedom tends to contribute to larger informality in all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries for the Heritage index, self employment and pension 
coverage, while deficient law and order explains the bulk of informality for the Schneider 
index.   
Education, measured by average years of secondary schooling, does not play a 
major role in explaining differences in informality with respect to Chile for any of four 
informality measures, even in the cases of Haiti and Honduras.  Socio-demographic 
factors are particularly important in explaining the differences regarding labor 
informality, and less so regarding production informality.  Moreover, in the case of labor 
informality, the larger the differences in informality with respect to Chile, the larger the 
importance of socio-demographic factors.  This is the case of, for instance, Haiti and 
Honduras, where all determinants of informality (excluding educational level) are about 
as important.  On the other hand, there is not such trend regarding the two production 
  13informality measures –for them, the variables dealing with the quality of the state are 
always more important, especially law and order for the Schneider index and regulatory 
freedom for the Heritage index.  
 
V. Conclusion   
By any measure, informality is quite prevalent in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean.  This is worrisome because it denotes misallocation of resources 
(labor in particular) and inefficient utilization of government services, which can 
jeopardize the countries’ growth and poverty-alleviation prospects.  The evidence 
presented in this chapter shows that informality has a statistically and economically 
significant negative impact on growth – and an equally significant positive impact on the 
incidence of poverty across countries. 
Informality arises when the costs of belonging to the economy’s legal and 
regulatory framework exceeds the benefits. Thus informality is more prevalent where the 
regulatory framework is burdensome, the quality of government services is low, and the 
state’s monitoring and enforcement capacity is weak. But these cost-benefit calculations 
are also affected by key structural characteristics of the economy – such as its productive 
and demographic structure and the availability of skilled labor. This chapter has argued 
that it is important to take into account all these factors when trying to ascertain the 
causes of informality.  
In the case of Latin America, this chapter has shown that informality is primarily 
the outcome of a combination of poor public services and a burdensome regulatory 
framework.  Low levels of education, as measured by secondary schooling, are less 
important in this respect.  In lower income countries, informality (particularly regarding 
labor markets) is exacerbated when the production structure is heavily based on 
agriculture and other rural activities and when the labor participation of young people, 
resulting from recent demographic transition, is large. 
Informality is a complex phenomenon that is best understood from several angles: 
considering different indicators that reflect its various aspects and treating it as both 
cause and consequence of underdevelopment.  This chapter is a modest contribution in 
this direction.   
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Table 1a. The Effect of Informality on Economic Growth,  
controlling for GDP per capita 
 
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2005, country average 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Initial GDP per capita -0.1966 -0.3519 -0.3498* -0.6910* -0.6976*** -0.7684*** -1.2819*** -1.7200***
    (2000 US$, 1985, in logs) 1.29 1.54 1.88 1.98 3.06 2.83 2.69 2.95
Schneider Shadow Economy -0.0747*** -0.1479***
    (% of GDP) 3.87 4.39
Heritage Foundation Informal Market -0.8009** -1.3294***
    (ranging 1-5: higher, more informality) 2.41 4.05
Self Employment -0.0657*** -0.1775***
    (% of total employment) 3.11 3.21
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme -0.0423*** -0.0872***
    (% of labor force) 2.80 3.39
Constant 5.4231*** 6.9131** 6.6475*** 9.2161** 11.8634*** 11.7604*** 17.1971*** 19.8890***
3.15 2.57 3.35 2.59 4.29 3.80 3.18 3.33
No. of observations 119 127 72 91 84 87 59 68
R-squared 0.20 0.08 0.13 0.11 - - - -
Hansen J Statistic (P-value) - - - - 0.48 0.21 0.30 0.70
OLS IV
Notes: 
1. Heteroskedasticity-robust t(z)-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
3. For IV regressions [5] to [8], 
 Endogenous variable: each of four informality measures. 
 Instruments: Law and order; Business regulatory freedom; Average Years of Secondary Schooling. 
 Sociodemographic factors is not included as an instrument because it does not pass the exogeneity 
test using the C statistic (Difference-in-Sargan statistic). 
4. See Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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Table 1b. The Effect of Informality on Economic Growth,  
controlling for government expenditure/GDP 
 
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2005, country average 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Initial Government Expenditure -0.0340* -0.0513** -0.0681*** -0.0588** -0.0593** -0.0717*** -0.1008** -0.0776***
    (% of GDP, 1985) 1.96 2.60 2.82 2.59 2.14 2.94 2.55 3.34
Schneider Shadow Economy -0.0622*** -0.0789***
    (% of GDP) 4.76 4.31
Heritage Foundation Informal Market -0.6724*** -0.6085***
    (ranging 1-5: higher, more informality) 5.52 4.18
Self Employment -0.0557*** -0.0596***
    (% of total employment) 3.84 2.85
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme -0.0183*** -0.0203***
    (% of labor force) 3.58 3.51
Constant 4.1214*** 4.5441*** 4.6023*** 3.5267*** 5.0933*** 4.6934*** 5.0909*** 4.1156***
6.71 7.98 6.69 6.19 6.18 6.72 4.50 6.70
No. of observations 112 118 69 85 88 91 59 72
R-squared 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.11 - - - -
Hansen J Statistic (P-value) - - - - 0.53 0.89 0.62 0.72
OLS IV
Notes: 
1. Heteroskedasticity-robust t(z)-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
3. For IV regressions [5] to [8], 
 Endogenous variable: each of four informality measures. 
 Instruments: Business regulatory freedom; Average Years of Secondary Schooling; 
Sociodemographic factors 
 Law and order is not included as an instrument because it does not pass the exogeneity test using 
the C statistic (Difference-in-Sargan statistic). 
4. See Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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Table 2a. The Effect of Informality on Poverty,  
controlling for GDP per capita 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty Headcount index, latest year 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Initial GDP per capita -0.1331*** -0.1028*** -0.0995*** -0.0656** -0.1129*** -0.0800*** -0.0796 -0.0346
    (2000 US$, 1985, in logs) 6.18 4.07 3.02 2.33 3.48 3.10 1.26 0.94
Schneider Shadow Economy 0.0067** 0.0104*
    (% of GDP) 2.34 1.71
Heritage Foundation Informal Market 0.0841** 0.1229*
    (ranging 1-5: higher, more informality) 2.38 1.89
Self Employment 0.0004 -0.0017
    (% of total employment) 0.22 0.24
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme 0.0031** 0.0051**
    (% of labor force) 2.34 2.08
Constant 0.8607*** 0.6053** 0.8476*** 0.4127 0.5717 0.3001 0.7636 0.0436
4.54 2.30 3.48 1.55 1.46 0.83 1.09 0.11
No. of observations 51 51 34 46 41 42 30 38
R-squared 0.51 0.42 0.34 0.35 - - - -
Hansen J Statistic (P-value) - - - - 0.47 0.33 0.11 0.69
OLS IV
Notes: 
1. Heteroskedasticity-robust t(z)-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
3. For IV regressions [5] to [8], 
 Endogenous variable: each of four informality measures. 
 Instruments: four determinants of informality (Law and order; Business regulatory freedom; 
Average Years of Secondary Schooling; Sociodemographic factors). 
4. See Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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Table 2b. The Effect of Informality on Poverty,  
controlling for government expenditure/GDP 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty Headcount index, latest year 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Initial Government Expenditure 0.0031 0.0096 0.0114 0.0063 0.0033 0.0157* 0.0224*** 0.0123
    (% of GDP, 1985) 0.51 1.58 1.09 1.01 0.37 1.86 3.44 1.54
Schneider Shadow Economy 0.0075* 0.0240***
    (% of GDP) 1.95 2.97
Heritage Foundation Informal Market 0.2135*** 0.2470***
    (ranging 1-5: higher, more informality) 4.41 3.47
Self Employment 0.0091 0.0230***
    (% of total employment) 1.51 3.08
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme 0.0064*** 0.0076***
    (% of labor force) 4.95 3.41
Constant -0.1130 -0.7019*** -0.2911 -0.3624*** -0.7887** -0.9201*** -0.9325*** -0.5467**
0.59 3.33 0.99 2.86 2.45 2.77 3.34 2.56
No. of observations 48 48 32 43 40 41 29 37
R-squared 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.36 - - - -
Hansen J Statistic (P-value) - - - - 0.25 0.14 0.52 0.61
OLS IV
Notes: 
1. Heteroskedasticity-robust t(z)-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
3. For IV regressions [5] to [8], 
 Endogenous variable: each of four informality measures. 
 Instruments: four determinants of informality (Law and order; Business regulatory freedom; 
Average Years of Secondary Schooling; Sociodemographic factors). 
4. See Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Informality 
Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent variable: Four types of informality measures, country average 
Schneider Shadow Heritage Foundation Self Non-contributor to
Economy index Informal Market index Employment Pension Scheme
Explanatory variables: (% of GDP) (1-5: higher, more) (% of total employment) (% of labor force)
Average of 2000-2005 by country [1] [2] [3] [4]
Law and Order -3.2360** -0.0969* -1.6925* -2.9764*
    (ICRG, index ranging 0-6: higher, better) -2.57 -1.76 -1.84 -1.67
Business Regulatory Freedom -2.0074* -0.5333*** -2.5196** -5.8675**
    (The Fraser Institute, index ranging 0-10: higher, -1.80 -9.95 -2.17 -2.28
     less regulated)
Average Years of Secondary Schooling -1.9684* -0.1152** -2.1527** -5.8114***
    (Barro and Lee 2001) -1.70 -2.00 -2.25 -3.27
Sociodemographic Factors 3.8438** 0.5027*** 5.9743*** 21.6130***
    (average of share of youth population, share of 2.00 4.99 3.77 7.31
     rural population, and share of agriculture in GDP)
Constant 60.3429*** 6.6326*** 54.7254*** 113.3110***
10.48 31.72 14.06 11.40
No. of observations 84 86 57 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.89 0.78 0.88
Informality measures
Notes: 
1. t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
3. See Appendix 1 for countries included in each regression and Appendix 2 for definitions and sources of 
variables and periods used to compute country averages of informality measures. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
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Figure 2. Informality and Basic Determinants 
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  23Figure 2. Informality and Basic Determinants (continued) 
 







































































1 2 3 4 5 6










































































3 4 5 6 7 8




































































0 1 2 3 4 5


















































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6



































































































3 4 5 6 7 8









































































0 1 2 3 4 5

















































































































Note: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
  24 

























































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70























































































1 2 3 4 5























































(% of total employment)
Predicted values



































































(% of labor force)
Predicted values






0 20 40 60 80 100
D. Non-contributor to Pension Scheme
 
Note: In each graph, a 45-degree line is drawn to show a distance between predicted and actual levels. 
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Note: Presented are all predicted levels, which may be above/below the actual max/min values. 
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Figure 5-A. Explanation of Differences in Informality, LAC Countries and Chile 
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Figure 5-B. Explanation of Differences in Informality, LAC Countries and Chile 
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Figure 5-C. Explanation of Differences in Informality, LAC Countries and Chile 
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Figure 5-D. Explanation of Differences in Informality, LAC Countries and Chile 





























































































































































(84 countries) (86 countries) (57 countries) (70 countries)
DZA Algeria √√√ √
ARG Argentina √√√ √
AUS Australia √√√ √
AUT Austria √√√ √
BGD Bangladesh √√√ √
BEL Belgium √√√ √
BOL Bolivia √√√ √
BWA Botswana √√
BRA Brazil √√√ √
CMR Cameroon √√√ √
CAN Canada √√√
CHL Chile √√√ √
CHN China √√ √
COL Colombia √√√ √
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. √
COG Congo, Rep. √√
CRI Costa Rica √√√ √
DNK Denmark √√√ √
DOM Dominican Rep. √√√ √
ECU Ecuador √√√ √
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. √√√ √
SLV El Salvador √√√ √
FIN Finland √√ √
FRA France √√√ √
DEU Germany √√√ √
GHA Ghana √√ √
GRC Greece √√√ √
GTM Guatemala √√√ √
GUY Guyana √
HTI Haiti √√
HND Honduras √√√ √
HKG Hong Kong, China √√√
HUN Hungary √√ √
ISL Iceland √√
IND India √√ √
IDN Indonesia √√√ √
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. √√√ √
IRL Ireland √√√ √
ITA Italy √√√ √
JAM Jamaica √√√ √
JPN Japan √√√ √
JOR Jordan √√ √
KEN Kenya √√ √
KOR Korea, Rep. √√√ √
KWT Kuwait √√
MWI Malawi √√
MYS Malaysia √√√ √
MLI Mali √√
MEX Mexico √√√ √
MAR Morocco √√√ √
MOZ Mozambique √√ √
NLD Netherlands √√√ √
NZL New Zealand √√√ √
NIC Nicaragua √√ √
NER Niger √√
NOR Norway √√√ √
PAK Pakistan √√√ √
PAN Panama √√√ √
PNG Papua New Guinea √√
PRY Paraguay √√ √
PER Peru √√√ √
PHL Philippines √√√ √
POL Poland √√ √
PRT Portugal √√√ √
SEN Senegal √√ √
SLE Sierra Leone √√ √
SGP Singapore √√√ √
ZAF South Africa √√√
ESP Spain √√√ √
LKA Sri Lanka √√√ √
SWE Sweden √√ √
CHE Switzerland √√√ √
SYR Syrian Arab Rep. √√√
TZA Tanzania √√ √
THA Thailand √√√ √
TGO Togo √√ √
TTO Trinidad and Tobago √√
TUN Tunisia √√√ √
TUR Turkey √√ √
UGA Uganda √√ √
ARE United Arab Emirates √√
GBR United Kingdom √√√ √
USA United States √√√ √
URY Uruguay √√√ √
VEN Venezuela, RB √√√ √
ZMB Zambia √√√ √
ZWE Zimbabwe √√ √  
  31Appendix 2. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Schneider Shadow 
Economy index





An index ranging 1 to 5 with higher values indicating more informal market activity. The 
scores and criteria are: (i) Very Low: Country has a free-market economy with informal 
market in such things as drugs and weapons (score is 1); (ii) Low: Country may have 
some informal market involvement in labor or pirating of intellectual property (score is 
2); (iii) Moderate: Country may have some informal market activities in labor, 
agriculture, and transportation, and moderate levels of intellectual property piracy (score 
is 3); (iv) High: Country may have substantial levels of informal market activity in such 
areas as labor, pirated intellectual property, and smuggled consumer goods, and in such 
services as transportation, electricity, and telecommunications (score is 4); and (v) Very 
High: Country’s informal market is larger than its formal economy (score is 5). Average 
of 2000-2005 by country.
Miles, Feulner, and O’Grady (2005).
Self Employment Self employed workers as the percentage of total employment. Country averages but 
periods to compute the averages vary by country. Average of 1999-2006 by country, but 
countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are excluded (Loayza and Rigolini 2006).




Labor force not contributing to a pension scheme as the percentage of total labor force. 
Average of 1993-2005 by country.
World Development Indicators, 
various years.
Per Capita GDP Growth Log difference of real GDP per capita (2000 US$). World Development Indicators, 
various years.








The fraction of the population with income below a given poverty line. The poverty line 
is $1 per person a day, converted into local currency using a PPP-adjusted exchange rate. 
The latest/final year of each country’s poverty spell is used.
Loayza and Raddatz (2006).
Initial Gini index A measure of income inequality ranging 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more 
inequal income distribution. The initial year of each country’s poverty spell is used.
Loayza and Raddatz (2006).
Law and Order An index ranging 0 to 6 with higher values indicating better governance. Law and Order 
are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising 0 to 3 points. Assessment 
of Law focuses on the legal system, while Order is rated by popular observance of the 
law. Average of 2000-2005 by country.




An index ranging 0 to 10 with higher values indicating less regulated. It is composed of 
following indicators: (i) Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their 
own prices; (ii) Burden of regulation / Administrative Conditions/Entry of New Business; 
(iii) Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a substantial amount 
of time dealing with government bureaucracy; (iv) Starting a new business: starting a new 
business is generally easy; and (v) Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments 
connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loan applications are very rare. Average of 2000-2005 
by country.
Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, and Leeson 
(2007), The Fraser Institute. Data 
retrieved from www.freetheworld.com.
Average Years of 
Secondary Schooling
Average years of secondary schooling in the population aged 15 and over. The most 
recent score in each country is used, while figures are computed for countries data are not 
available.




Simple average of following three variables: (i) Youth (aged 10-24) population as the 
percentage of total population; (ii) Rural population as the percentage of total population; 
and (iii) Agriculture as the percentage of GDP. All three variables are standardized before 
the average is taken. Average of 2000-2005 by country.
Authors’ calculations with data from 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive Statistics 
    Data in country averages; periods vary by informality measure 
(a) Univariate (regression sample) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Schneider Shadow Economy index
        (% of GDP)
84 32.960 14.735 8.550 68.200
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
        (range 1-5: higher, more informality)
86 3.055 1.251 1.000 5.000
Self Employment (% of total employment) 57 26.204 12.028 7.132 59.335
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme
        (% of labor force)
70 53.198 33.482 1.450 98.000
 
(b) Univariate (full sample) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Schneider Shadow Economy index
        (% of GDP)
145 34.838 13.214 8.550 68.200
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
        (range 1-5: higher, more informality)
159 3.409 1.201 1.000 5.000
Self Employment (% of total employment) 86 25.158 12.118 1.119 59.335
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme
        (% of labor force)
110 55.999 31.905 1.450 98.500
 
(c) Bivariate Correlations between Informality Measures 





















Schneider Shadow Economy index
        (% of GDP)
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
        (range 1-5: higher, more informality)
Self Employment (% of total employment)
Non-contributor to Pension Scheme













1. Sample sizes are presented below the corresponding coefficients. 
2. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
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